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Butler's Dilemma: Lord Butler's Inquiry and the Re-Assessment of Intelligence on Iraq's WMD

Page 10 of 10

Appendix B: Summary Findings of the Iraq Survey Group, October 2003

According to David Kay in his October statement to Congress, findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) included:

  • A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
  • A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
  • Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.
  • New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
  • Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
  • A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
  • Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.
  • Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
  • Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment (Kay 2003).

References

Bruce Lockhart, John. 1987. 'A British View of Intelligence' K.G. (Ken) Robertson British and American Approaches to Intelligence London: Macmillan.

Davies, Philip. 2004. 'Cherry-Picking a Fight with Saddam' Times Higher Education Supplement February 20.

Davies, Philip. 2000. 'MI6's Requirements Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of Government' Public Administration 78:1.

Glees, Anthony and Davies, Philip. 2004. Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government and the Hutton Inquiry. London: Social Affairs Unit

Godson, Roy. 1987. 'Intelligence: an American View' K.G. (Ken) Robertson British and American Approaches to Intelligence London: Macmillan.

Godson, Roy. 1979. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Centre.

Graham, Daneil O. 1979. 'Analysis and Estimates' in Roy Godson ed. Intelligence Requiremements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence. Washington DC: National Strategy Information Centre.

Greenstock, Jeremy. 2004. Interview in The Times 5 July.

Halevy, Ephraim. 2004. 'Intelligence and the Making of Foreign Policy: A Personal Reflection' The Portland Trust Annual Lecture.

Hersh, Seymour. 'The Stovepipe' The New Yorker downloadable http:
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031027fa_fact

Kay, David. 2003. 'Statement by David Kay on the Internim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on in Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence' October 2.

Senate 2004. Report on the Intelligence Community's Prewar Assessments on Iraq.

Washington, DC: United States Congress.

Tenet, George. 2002. Letter to Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. October 7.

Tenet, George. 2004. 'Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Remarks as prepared for delivery by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet at Georgetown University' 5 February.

Whitwell, John (Leslie Nicholson). 1966. British Agent London: William Kimber.

The Authors

Professor Anthony Glees is Director of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) at Brunel University. He is one of the founding figures of the academic study of intelligence and security issues in the UK. His publications on intelligence include his recent The Stasi Files: East Germany's Secret Operations Against Britain (London: Free Press, 2003), The Secrets of the Service: British Intelligence and Communist Subversion 1939-51 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987) and 'War Crimes: the Security and Intelligence Dimension' in Intelligence and National Security 7:3 (1992). Professor Glees' main research project in the field is a study of options and prospects for European intelligence integration, funded in part by a grant from the European Ideas Network.

Dr. Philip H.J. Davies is the Deputy Director of BCISS. He specialises in the policy- and management-oriented study of national intelligence institutions and their activities. His publications on intelligence include a detailed organisation and methods study of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, aka MI6), MI 6 and the Machinery of Spying to be published by Taylor and Francis in July/August 2004, The British Secret Services (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1996) and a range of articles in journals such as Intelligence and National Security, Public Administration and Harvard International Review. His current project is a comparative government study of intelligence in the governments of the United States and Great Britain, funded by a Leverhulme Research Fellowship.

The Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS):

BCISS is Britain's first (and at present only) specialist research centre dedicated to the study of national intelligence and security issues and policy. It was set up at Brunel University in November 2003 by Professor Glees and Dr. Davies to act as a non-partisan locus for research projects and collaboration, policy analysis and consultancy on intelligence, and to provide an informed input to public debates concerning intelligence agencies and their role in government and politics. Members of BCISS were the main academic source on intelligence consulted by the electronic and print media in Britain during the recent furores surrounding intelligence in the UK including those surrounding the publication of Lord Hutton's report (subject of this SAU report), revelations concerning possible British intelligence operations against members of the UN security council, and the appointment of John Scarlett as the new Chief of the SIS. BCISS scholars have also published articles and provided comment on these events, and other intelligence-related issues, to news media in Europe and North America. BCISS also provides the basis for a range of graduate programmes concerning intelligence taught at Brunel University including the new MA in Intelligence and Security Studies (MA/ISS), and research degrees at the M Phil and PhD levels. More information about BCISS and its activities can be found on the BCISS webpage at www.brunel.ac.uk/research/BCISS.


[1] 'Walking the cat back' is a US intelligence colloquialism referring to retracing one's steps to establish where an operation, assessment or decision went wrong.

[2] BCISS has been in receipt of confidential information from two senior German government sources; both insisted the German government had received clear evidence of WMD in Iraq but for political reasons had determined not to act upon it, a co-decision reached on the basis of the same information with France 06.03.04; confidential information from two senior Israeli sources stated that Mossad had collected the same intelligence 07.03.04 and 21.06.04. Mossad, however, had not been able to penetrate Saddam's inner circle and realised it had some difficulty in gaining precise information about his intentions and goals]. Sir Jeremy Greenstock (who was in a position to know) has publicly declared that the intelligence of WMD produced by 'the French, German and Russian systems was quite compelling' (although the use of the word 'quite' can, of course, contain two rather different meanings!) (Greenstock, 2004).

[3] This formulation is adapted in part from Roy Godson's 'Elements of Intelligence' (Godson, 1979; 1987) as adapted to the UK context through the inclusion of Requirements as a separate element as suggested by former Deputy Chief of the SIS, the late John Bruce Lockhart (1987). Omitted from the present list is Covert Action, an element not immediately relevant to the present crisis in intelligence.

[4] Penkovsky's technical intelligence was disseminated by the CIA in Washington as IRONBARK and as RUPEE by SIS to the UK government. His political intelligence was separated and circulated as CHICKADEE in Washington and ARNICA in London.


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